week 7

Based on the analysis of archive, discourse and statement, Foucault summarizes four major differences between Archeology and traditional history of ideas, which he thinks are “the utmost importance”(p138): the attribution of innovation, the analysis of contradictions, comparative descriptions, and the mapping of transformations (p138). By examining these different points in four chapters, he is trying to “grasp the specific qualities of archaeological analysis, and measure its descriptive capacity”(p138) .
According to Foucault, history of ideas has two functions: on the one hand, it “recounts the by-ways and margins of history (p136)”; on the other hand, it “sets out to cross the boundaries of existing disciplines, to deal with them from the outside, and to reinterpret them (137)”. Therefore, history of ideas is a discipline with “beginning and ending, is a description of obscure continuities and returns, the reconstitution of development in the linear form of history (137).” That is why this discipline focuses so much on the originality, continuity, and totality, since they are the themes of history of ideas. But Foucault refuses the originality, continuity, and totally that history of ideas uses in its explanation of development of human beings’knowledge. He also refuses comparative method, which replies on the comparison and analogy to find the similarity of different ideas; he refuses typology method, which works on establishing the category, grade, class or attribute of diverse knowledge; he refuses any historical explanation based on the ideas or spirits of that historical period (p166-177). In other words, Foucault opposes metaphysical “totality”or “continuity”in history, and the history determinism. History, in Foucault’s understanding, does not exist the so called “ultimate goal,”nor is it in a “rational progress ”, but the one that plays the power transformation from one form to another. People, according to Foucault, are not the subject of history but the product of history, who are decided by the practice of discourse. History, essentially speaking, does not have subject at all. The objection to the existence of subjects in history means that all the concepts, knowledge, or ideas that related to their subjects are totally cut off, and the so called mainstream value standard, the rationality, the truth, or the progression, like madness, crimes, are constructed by specific practice of discourse in specific historical period, and are subject to possessing different meanings according to the change of the history, including modernity.
Modernity started from 18th century by the movement of enlightenment. It marks the birth of “the age of reason”. Kant and Hegel all suppost that reason is the original power of the advancement of history. Reason constructed the skyscraper of human civilization and will guide the history in a rational and advanced way. However, reason also takes the world wars, the Holocaulst, the economic crisis, the atomic bombs, and the increasingly enlarged gab between the poor and the rich. Similar to Frankfort school, Foucault also criticizes the control power of reason. When we use our reason to conquer the nature and other objects, we exert this control power to the every corner of the society, including the history. Foucault believes that reason is the result of the practice of discourse and power. There is not a pure, neutral, independent discourse that is not controlled by power. Reason does not just help to conceal the social caste, but also serve to establish this caste. Based on this, Foucault challenged sciences and disciples (p178-195). He proposes that the scholars in different disciplines established different discourse space by their own discourse skills, similar to Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigms. These different disciplines are connected and restricted by the relationship of discourse. From here , we could see the difference between Foucault and Marx,: Foucault criticizes Marx’s totality way of analysis, pointing out that practices are always local, regional, or not total practices, and should not be used as tool to construct truth. The reason he said this is because he analyzes knowledge, disciplines and sciences from the perspective of discourse, which makes him easily avoid the risk of arguing the feasibility of practice in constructing truth.